Introduction
After the initial contributions of Radner (1968) and Prescott-Townsend (1984) , the analysis of competitive equilibria of economies with asymmetric information has recently received renewed attention. For such economies the interaction between the private information dimension (e.g. the unobservable action in the moral hazard case) and the observability of agents' trades plays a crucial role, since trades have typically informational content over the agents' private information. In particular, to decentralize incentive e±cient Pareto optimal allocations the availability of fully exclusive contracts, i.e. of contracts whose terms (price and payo®) depend on the transactions in all other markets of the agent trading the contract, is generally required. The implementation of these contracts imposes typically the very strong informational requirement that all trades of an agent need to be observed.
We do observe though agents engaging in di®erent contractual relationships (e.g. having loans both from banks and credit card companies, holding various insurance policies,...). It is then of interest to analyze also situations where contracts traded are necessarily non-exclusive, because perfect monitoring of trades is not available. The case of complete anonymity of trades, where no transaction of the agents is observable, constitutes an important benchmark in this respect.
In the framework of a Walrasian competitive equilibrium model, alternative assumptions on the observability of agents' trades may be captured, in a somewhat reduced form, by alternative assumptions on the possible non-linearities of equilibrium prices. The complete observability of trades (exclusivity) is captured by allowing price schedules to be arbitrary non-linear functions of agents' trades. At the other extreme, complete anonimity of trades (full non-exclusivity) corresponds to restricting price schedules to be a linear function of trades. Close to this is the case in which only short and long trading positions can be distinguished, and is captured by price schedules characterized by distinct bid and ask prices.
The existence of competitive equilibria with linear prices has been recently investigated by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1995) , , Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (1998) . It is shown that, with asymmetric information, a minimal form of non-linearity, i.e. the possibility of having a di®erent price for buyers and sellers (a bid-ask spread), is necessary (in fact also su±cient) for competitive equilibria to exist. Existence of competitive equilibria with general non-linear price schedules for asymmetric information economies has been studied by Prescott-Townsend (1984) . 1 To better evaluate the informational requirements and the structure of markets implicit in these competitive equilibrium notions, it is important to examine the conditions under which such equilibria can be obtained as the limit, as the number of strategic traders gets large, of the Nash equilibria of a game (where information and strategy sets are explicitly modelled). In this paper we consider a simple economy with moral hazard (i.e. where agents undertake a possibly unobservable action), and examine whether, for di®erent assumptions about the observability of agents' trades, the (Nash) equilibria of the economy where strate-gic¯nancial intermediaries compete by issuing contracts converge, as the number of intermediaries gets large, to the competitive equilibria of the economy.
With symmetric information the equilibria of the model with strategic intermediaries always converge, no matter what is the information available to intermediaries over agents' trades, to competitive equilibria with linear prices. In the presence of asymmetric information, with complete observability of trades (i.e. when intermediaries are able to implement exclusive contracts) convergence also holds: the Nash equilibria converge, in this case to the (incentive e±cient) competitive equilibria with fully non-linear prices 2 . On the other hand, when information over agents' trades is more limited, convergence is not always ensured.
We consider in particular the case in which each intermediary cannot observe any of the trades agents make with other intermediaries, nor whether agents engage in re-trading fractions of the contracts they purchased (or sold) from them. Intermediaries are only able to monitor the transactions each agent makes with them; hence the only restrictions they can implement are restrictions preventing agents from buying multiple units of the contracts they issue. In such a situation while, as we already argued, when agents' e®ort is commonly observed (i.e. information is symmetric) equilibria converge to competitive equilibria with linear prices, the same is not true with asymmetric information. More precisely, we will show that there exists an open set of parameter values describing the economy for which we do not have convergence: the (Nash) equilibria with strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of the competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads (i.e. to the competitive equilibria exhibiting the informationally least demanding form of non-linearity which ensures existence). In other words, the ability of intermediaries to prevent agents from buying multiple units of the contracts they issue interacts with the asymmetry of information (the unobservability of agents' e®ort choices) to generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts. Thus the source of the di±culties for convergence is the combination of the presence of asymmetric information and the restrictions on the observability of trades which prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationships.
Finally, we show that convergence to competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads again obtains if we assume that each intermediary is unable to observe even the total amount of trades an agent is making with him, and hence cannot prevent the agent from buying multiples of the contracts he issues.
Not much work exists on convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with asymmetric information. It is noteworthy though that, for a particular class of economies with adverse selection, Biais-Martimort-Rochet (1997) obtain convergence of the equilibria with strategic intermediaries to competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads also when intermediaries can prevent agents from buying multiple units of the contracts they issue.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the economy and de¯ne competitive equilibria as well as the equilibria of the game played bȳ nancial intermediaries. Convergence is analyzed in section 3. It is¯rst shown that convergence holds when information is symmetric (Proposition 1) as well as in the case of complete observability of trades (Proposition 2) and no observability of trades (Proposition 3). The following result (Propositions 4) shows that, when information over trades allows intermediaries to prevent multiple trades by the same agent, convergence to competitive equilibria with bid ask spreads fails.
The Economy
We consider an economy where asymmetric information is of the moral hazard (hidden action) type. There are countably many agents, all ex-ante identical; agents are indexed by n 2 N . There are two periods, t = 0; 1; and a single consumption good. Consumption only takes place at t = 1. Uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, and is described by the collection of random variables (s n ) n2N ; assumed to be identically and independently distributed, with support S = fH; Lg; the realization of (s n ) n2N is commonly observable. Uncertainty en-ters the economy via the agents' endowments. The (date 1) endowment of agent n isw n = w(s n ); let w H´w (H); w L´w (L) be the agent's endowment in, respectively, the idiosyncratic state H and state L. Each agents also undertakes a (possibly) unobservable action -we will refer to it as e®ort -which a®ects the probability of the realization of his idiosyncratic shock. There are two possible e®ort levels a; b; let ¼(e) be the probability of the realization s = H given the e®ort level e 2 fa; bg:
Agents' preferences are represented by a (Von Neumann -Morgenstern) utility function of the following form:
where (c H ; c L ) denotes consumption respectively in state H and L, c´(c H ; c L ), and v(e) denoted the disutility of e®ort e. 3 We assume that:
so that a is the`high' e®ort and H is the 'good' state. Let -be the set of parameter values (v(a); v(b); ¼(a); ¼(b); w H ; w L ) of the economy which satisfy the above assumptions and the additional condition that at the incentive constrained Pareto optima (see Bisin-Guaitoli (1998) for the standard de¯nition) agents undertake the high e®ort level, e = a.
Competitive Equilibria
Competitive equilibria are characterized by the following market structure: every agent has access to a complete set of pure contingent claims conditional on his idiosyncratic uncertainty. In particular, and without loss of generality, two securities are available for trade, the¯rst paying o® one unit of the consumption good in state H, and the second paying o® one unit in state L.
In the benchmark case of symmetric information (when the e®ort level e chosen by each agent is observed) the de¯nition of competitive equilibrium can be written as follows. Let q e (s) denote the (linear) price of the security paying o® in state s for agents choosing e®ort e. 4 De¯nition 1. A competitive equilibrium with symmetric information 5 is given by prices (q e (s); e = a; b; s = H; L), allocations and e®ort (c H ; c L ; e), such that:
(i) (c H ; c L ; e) solves the agent's optimization problem
(ii) markets clear 6 :
Both in the budget constraint and in the market clearing condition we have used the fact that the level of trade in the security which pays o® is state s 2 fH; Lg equals the excess demand in the same state, (c s ¡ w s ).
For economies with asymmetric information (i.e. e®ort e is unobservable), we will consider two cases with regard to the possible forms of the pricing functional.
The¯rst is the case in which prices allow for a bid-ask spread but are otherwise linear. To de¯ne competitive equilibria in this set-up some additional notation is needed. Let q + (H) and q ¡ (H) denote respectively the buying and selling price of the security paying o® if state H occurs; q + (L) and q ¡ (L) denote the buying and selling prices of the security paying o® if state L occurs. Let (x) + denote max(0; x) and (x) ¡ denote min(0; x).
De¯nition 2.
A competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information and bidask spreads is given by a pair of (bid and ask) prices for each of the two states, (q + (s); q ¡ (s); s = H; L) and a vector (c H ; c L ; e); such that:
(ii) markets clear:
The second case we consider with regard to the form of the pricing functional is the case in which arbitrary non-linear prices are allowed. Let q(c H ¡ w H ; c L ¡ w L ) denote a general non-linear function mapping trades into their value. We then have:
De¯nition 3. A competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information and nonlinear prices is given by a map q : < 2 ! < and a vector (c H ; c L ; e); such that:
Strategic Equilibria
We present here the strategic equilibrium notion we shall consider in this paper. Assume now the economy is also populated by I¯nancial intermediaries. Each intermediary i = 1; : : : ; I can issue J i contracts (securities), indexed by j i = 1; : : : ; J i ; J i is assumed given, and large. 7 Let J´P i J i ; also, we let J; J i denote the sets of contracts which can be issued as well as their cardinality. A contract is identi¯ed by a vector of (possibly negative) payo®s paid by the intermediary to the buyer of the contract, conditionally on the realization of the publicly observable characteristics of the agent trading the contract. More precisely, when e®ort is unobservable, a contract j is a pair d j = (d j;H ; d j;L ) describing the payo® respectively in state H and L: 8 Given the set of contracts issued by all intermediaries, agents choose which contracts to enter and which e®ort level to undertake; their consumption level is then uniquely determined by their choice of contracts. Perfectly anticipating the agents' choices, as a function of the set of contracts available to them, intermediaries strategically choose which contracts to issue, so as to maximize pro¯ts.
With regard to the information available to intermediaries over agents' trades three cases will be considered:
It is notationally convenient to de¯ne equilibria for asymmetric information economies¯rst. In the case of no observability of trades, letting f¸jig j i 2J i ;i2I denote the agent's portfolio choices, the problem solved by agents, given the set of contracts d´(d j i ) j2J i ;i2I issued by intermediaries, can be formally described as follows:
Note that the portfolio choices of each agent are restricted to be non-negative. This is without loss of generality because the intermediaries can distinguish the buying and selling positions of each agent, and selling positions can also be described as buying positions of contracts with negative payo®s. The optimization problem faced by each intermediary i 2 I; given
Thus intermediaries play a simultaneous game, in which the choice variable is the menu of contracts they issue, and perfectly anticipate the agents' choices as a function of the set of contracts issued. 9
De¯nition 4. An equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and no observability of trades is then an array f(¸; e; c); dg such that:
(i) (¸; e; c) solves problem (P ) given d;
In the case of no observability of other trades, the agents' problem, given the set of contracts d´(d j i ) j2J i ;i2I issued by intermediaries, is:
where agents' portfolio in each security j is restricted to the set [0; 1] , because the intermediary can impose an upper bound (with no loss of generality set equal to one) on trades in its own contracts. 10 The intermediaries' choice problem is then obtained by a straightforward reformulation of the one above, replacing (P ) with (P 0 ) in (2.7). The formal de¯nition of an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and no observability of other trades is similarly obtained from De¯nition 4 by replacing (P ) with (P 0 ).
Finally, in the case of complete observability of trades, the agents' problem, given the set of contracts d´(d j i ) j2J i ;i2I , is :
The speci¯cation of the intermediaries' choice problem and the formal de¯nition of an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and complete observability of trades are again obtained by replacing (P ) with (P 00 ) respectively in (2.7) and De¯nition 4.
For economies with symmetric information, since e®ort e is observable, intermediaries are allowed to index the payo® of the contracts they o®er to e. We can then capture the di®erent assumptions on observability of trades with the same restrictions as above on the choice of¸j, for all j.
The problem solved by agents, given the set of contracts d´(d j i ) j2J i ;i2I issued by intermediaries, can then be formally described as follows:
The set of contracts each intermediary can issue is now larger than in the case of no observability of trades. However, since the number J i of contracts which intermediary i issues has been set arbitrarily large, this situation can be modelled by assuming that, as in the previous case, the intermediary issues J i contracts; however, with no observability of other trades, contracts are characterized not only by their payo® but also by an upper bound on trade in them. The same is true in the other case analyzed next.
s;e ; s 2 fH; Lg; e 2 fa; bg where ¤ corresponds to < J + , [0; 1] J , ©¸j 2 f0; 1g; 8j :¸ji = 1 )¸j0i0 = 0; 8j 0i 0 6 = j i ª , respectively, for the case of no observability of trades, no observability of other trades, and complete observability of trades.
The optimization problem faced by each intermediary i 2 I; given (d j i 0 ) j i 0 2J i 0 ; i 0 6 = i; is then:
The de¯nition of equilibrium under the di®erent assumptions on observability of trades for economies with symmetric information are a straightforward extension of those for economies with asymmetric information.
Convergence
We begin by showing that convergence always holds when information is symmetric (i.e. e®ort is commonly observable), for each of the above possible assumptions about the observability of trades.
Proposition 1. When e®ort is publicly observable, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium, where all agents undertake the high level of e®ort and fully insure, at fair odds (i.e. the consumption allocations satisfy c H ¡w H c L ¡w L = ¡ 1¡¼(a) ¼(a) ). 11 For I su±ciently large, equilibria with strategic intermediaries, for all the assumption on observability of trades, are characterized by the same allocations.
The existence (and in fact the Pareto optimality) of such equilibria is immediate, given the simple structure of the economy. Convergence also follows by a standard argument. At any equilibrium with strategic intermediaries, as long as I¸2; all contracts traded o®er full insurance, conditionally on a high level of 11 Strictly speaking, there are also other equilibria, with an unfair price (i.e. q a (H) q a (L) 6 = ¼(a) 1¡¼(a) ) and no trade on the contracts contingent on a high level of e®ort. Such equilibria though are not robust to any re¯nement in the spirit of trembling hand perfection (see Gale (1992) ). e®ort, at fair prices. In fact contracts o®ering full insurance at more than fair prices make negative pro¯ts and hence will not be issued. On the other hand, contracts o®ering insurance at less than fair prices can never be an equilibrium outcome as, if they are traded, a pro¯table opportunity for undercutting arises. By similar considerations we can show that contracts o®ering less or more than full insurance at fair prices cannot be traded at equilibrium.
When e®ort is privately observed strategic equilibria with complete observability of trades do converge to competitive equilibria with asymmetric information and non-linear prices.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique, incentive e±cient, competitive equilibrium 12 with non-linear prices where all agents undertake the high level of e®ort and achieve partial insurance. For I su±ciently large, all equilibria with strategic intermediaries and complete observability of trades also support the same allocation.
Proof. Let e(c H ¡ w H ; c L ¡ w L ) be the map describing the agents' optimal choice of e®ort, for any possible level of net trades. In the framework of the economy under examination, this map is well-de¯ned and single-valued (except at one point where agents' are indi®erent in the e®ort choice). Consider then the pricing functional q ¡ e(c H ¡ w H ; c L ¡ w L ) ¢ ; it is immediate to see that this pricing functional constitutes a competitive equilibrium with nonlinear prices, and decentralizes the incentive e±cient allocation. Turning next to the equilibrium with strategic intermediaries, by a similar argument as in Proposition 1, as long as there are I > 2 intermediaries, they will always choose to issue exclusive contracts o®ering partial insurance, at the incentive e±cient level, and inducing a high level of e®ort.
We will show next that strategic equilibria with no observability of trades do converge to competitive equilibria with asymmetric information and bid-ask spreads. For this, we consider¯rst what are the properties of competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads. It should be clear, given the simple structure of the economy and the speci¯cation of contracts available to agents, that competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads, if they exist, can only be of the following three types:
1. equilibria with low e®ort and full insurance (i.e. c H = c
2. equilibria with no trade and high e®ort (i.e. c H = w H ; c L = w L ; e = a);
3. 'mixed' equilibria, where a fraction of the agents in the population exert high e®ort, while the others exert low e®ort, and both buy insurance, at the same price
c L (a)¡w L ); though in di®erent amounts.
In Bisin and Gottardi (1997) it is shown that a competitive equilibrium always exists in this set-up, and a complete characterization is provided of the set of equilibria for the various regions of the parameter space -:
Proposition 3. For I su±ciently large, all strategic equilibria with no observability of trades are characterized by the same allocation as competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread.
Again, the proof follows by a simple`Bertrand competition' argument.
On the other hand, we will now show that when there is asymmetric information and no observability of other trades, convergence to competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread may not hold. In other words, when intermediaries can impose an upper bound restriction on agents' trades with themselves, they can exploit this restriction to produce a barrier to the entry of other intermediaries, thereby obstructing convergence of strategic equilibria to competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads.
Note that the intermediaries' ability to construct barriers to entry by exploiting their information on agents' trades vanishes in the limit for the number of intermediaries I tending to in¯nity, in economies with symmetric information (as shown in Proposition 1), as well as in economies with complete observability of trades (Proposition 2). Moreover, in the class of economies with adverse selection studied by Bias-Martimort-Rochet (1997), barriers to entry also vanish in the limit and the convergence to competitive equilibrium allocations with bid-ask spreads obtain.
To show that convergence may fail in economies with no observability of other trades, we focus our attention here on the equilibria for a subset of the parameter space:
There exists an open set of economies ¡ ½ -such that for any economy in ¡ the only competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads are either equilibria with no trade and high e®ort, or`mixed' equilibria.
Proof. The proof is immediate. Let ¡ = fv(a); v(b); ¼(a); ¼(b); w H ; w L 2 -:
It is straightforward to check that ¡ 6 = ;: The¯rst inequality de¯ning ¡ implies that, if agents' e®ort level is high, their optimal choice of trade in insurance contracts, at the prices q ¡ (H
; is zero (i.e. no trade). The second inequality then says that, at these prices, agents prefer to exert a high level of e®ort (and hence a zero level of trade in insurance contracts) to a low e®ort level, and the optimal level of trades in that case, i.e. full insurance. Hence for economies in ¡ competitive equilibria with low e®ort do not exist. Since, by the argument in Bisin and Gottardi (1997) , we know that competitive equilibria with bid-spreads always exist, we conclude that only no trade equilibria with high e®ort, or`mixed' equilibria, exist in this region.
The following result then shows that for an open set of economies having a nonempty intersection with the set of economies whose competitive equilibria have been characterized in Lemma 1, and for I large, no equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and no observability of other trades can be`close' to any of the competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread, i.e. that convergence does not hold. More precisely:
For an open subset of economies no equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and no observability of other trades converges, for I ! 1, to a competitive equilibrium with bid ask spreads.
Proof.
The proof is organized in four main steps.
In the¯rst three steps the result is established for the case in which the agents' admissible portfolio choices are restricted to lie in the set¸2 f0; 1g J ; i.e. agents are not allowed to buy fractions of the contracts issued.
Step 1 shows that there is there is an open, non-empty subset ¡ 0 ½ -of economies, for each of which there exists a non-empty set of consumption allocations (di®erent from the endowment point) with the property that agents, at those allocations, prefer to exert the high e®ort level and not to trade any contract o®ering supplemental insurance at the rate 1¡¼(b) ¼(b) . Furthermore, we show that the intersection of ¡ 0 with the set ¡, characterized in Lemma 1, is also non-empty and open.
In the rest of the argument it is shown that, for all economies in ¡ 0 , all the Nash equilibria with strategic intermediaries are di®erent, for I large enough, both from the no trade equilibria with high e®ort and the`mixed' equilibria. Since, by Lemma 1, the competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread of all economies in ¡ can only be of either of these two types, it follows that, for all economies in ¡ \ ¡ 0 ; no strategic equilibrium converges to a competitive equilibrium with bid-ask spreads.
In Step 2 it is shown that for all economies in ¡ \ ¡ 0 ; a zero level of trade (with high e®ort) cannot be an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries, if I is su±ciently large. This will be established by proving that at the no trade allocation there are contracts, which if o®ered, would lead the agents to a strictly preferred allocation (i.e. would be accepted) and would make positive pro¯ts. Thus there exists a pro¯table deviation, so the no trade allocation cannot be supported as an equilibrium. The complication in the argument comes from the fact that we have to show that pro¯table deviations exist even in the presence of latent contracts', i.e. non-trivial contracts which are not traded at equilibrium, but play a role in deterring entry, or the proposal of other contracts. 13 In Step 3 it is then shown that the same result is true for the allocation at a 'mixed' equilibrium.
Finally, in Step 4 we show that the result obtained above extends to the case in which agents are allowed to trade fractions of the contracts o®ered, i.e. their admissible portfolio choices lie in the set [0; 1]:
Step 1. Let A be the set of pairs (c L ; c H )¸0 such that
This is a section of a cone with vertex at the endowment point and boundary dened by the two lines, with slope, respectively 1¡¼(a) ¼(a) and 1¡¼(b) ¼(b) ; which go through the endowment point (i.e. the zero pro¯t loci for high and low e®ort respectively); see Figure 1 . All contracts in A such that¯d j;H =d j;L¯2 ³ 1¡¼(a)
Denote then by B the set of pairs (c L ; c H )¸0 such that
This region identi¯es the set of consumption allocations where agents prefer to exert high e®ort, and are not willing to buy additional contracts, o®ering them full insurance, at the rate (1 ¡ ¼(b))=¼(b) 14 : Rewrite inequality (3.1) as follows:
It can be easily veri¯ed that if the following condition holds:
the set B is a non-empty cone with vertex at the origin. Furthermore, the boundary of B is given by two rays through the origin with slope ® 1 ; ® 2 ; both strictly greater than one, which are obtained as solutions of the equation:
Let ¡ 0 ½ -be de¯ned by the set of parameter values which satisfy (3.2) as well as the following additional condition:
3)
It is immediate to see that the set ¡ 0 is open, non-empty. Furthermore, for any economy whose parameter values lie in ¡ 0 the subsets A and B of the space of allocations described above have a non-empty intersection, which is di®erent from the singleton set containing only the endowment point fw H ; w L g. Recalling then the characterization of the set ¡ given in Lemma 1, we can also say that for any economy in ¡ the endowment point is an interior point of the set B; so that A \ B 6 = ;; A \ B ¾ fw H ; w L g; hence any such economy also belongs to the set ¡ 0 ; or ¡ ½ ¡ 0 :
Step 2. We will show¯rst that, for all economies in ¡ \ ¡ 0 , there is no equilibrium in which all agents remain at their endowment point (i.e. there is no trade). Since for such economies the endowment point belongs to the interior of B, at a no trade allocation agents choose e®ort a: At any point of A\ B (as in any point of underinsurance) the agents' marginal rate of substitution is (in absolute value) greater than (1 ¡ ¼(a))=¼(a). Hence there are allocations, in the interior of A \ B; which are strictly preferred by agents so that, if no other non-trivial contract is issued, there are also contracts which if proposed would make positive pro¯ts.
To complete the argument for this case we need to show that a pro¯table deviation exists even if the no trade allocation obtains when`latent contracts' are issued. Since the endowment point belongs to the interior of B, any contract such that ¹ d j;H = ¹ d j;L = ¡(1 ¡ ¼(b))=¼(b) is indeed a possible`latent' contract, as it satis¯es the condition of not being traded at the endowment point. However such contract will also not be traded at any other point in A \ B; thus it cannot deter the pro¯table deviation described above.
We will show next that no other contract, i.e. no contract with payo® such that ¡
is an admissible`latent' contract. If such contract is such that w H +d j;H 6 = w L +d j;L ; there always exists another contract, with payo® ¡ ³d j;H =d j;L´2 ³d j;H =d j;L ; 1¡¼(b) ¼(b) + ²´; for some small ² > 0; such that agents strictly prefer to trade both contract (d j;H ;d j;L ) and (d j;H ;d j;L ); and exert the low e®ort, so the intermediaries issuing (d j;H ;d j;L ) would make nega-tive pro¯ts (while those issuing (d j;H ;d j;L ) make positive pro¯ts). 15 Hence issuing contract (d j;H ;d j;L ) is not an optimal choice of an intermediary. On the other hand if w H +d j;H = w L +d j;L there is always another contract, as we already argued above, supporting an allocation in A \ B, which is strictly preferred by the agent; hence issuing such a contract, rather than (d j;H ;d j;L ); would allow the intermediary to obtain higher (positive) pro¯ts. Note that this is true whether or not the`latent' contracts with payo® ( ¹ d j;H ; ¹ d j;L ) are also issued. Moreover, even if the contract (d j;H ;d j;L ) is`split' among any¯nite number 16 of intermediaries each issuing a fraction of it, a pro¯table deviation still exists. Any intermediary issuing a fraction of the contract can in fact attain higher pro¯ts by issuing, instead of this fraction, a properly selected contract supporting an allocation in A\B. This completes the argument that contracts with payo®s ¡
re not admissible`latent' contracts.
Step 3. We will show next that no equilibrium exists where a fraction of the agents choose a high and the others a low level of e®ort, both buy insurance and the consumption allocations satisfy the condition
c L (a)¡w L (i.e. they both lie on the same line, going through the endowment point (w H ; w L )): Evidently, in this case agents must be indi®erent between the two e®ort levels a; b and the associated allocations (c H (a); c L (a)), (c H (b); c L (b)). Moreover, it must be ; there is always another allocation which is strictly preferred to 15 Take (d j;H ;d j;L ) o®ering positive insurance at a rate slightly higher than (1 ¡ ¼(b))=¼(b) if w H +d j;H > w L +d j;L ; or negative insurance at a rate slightly lower than (1 ¡ ¼(b))=¼(b) if w H +d j;H < w L +d j;L : 16 We should point out that also in the limit case, when I = 1; the same conclusion holds, though by a slighly di®erent argument.
; the contracts would make positive pro¯ts, but a pro¯table deviation exists, given by contracts o®ering a slightly higher payo® in both states. When the inequality holds in the opposite direction the contracts make negative pro¯ts.
(c H (a); c L (a)) by agents making high e®ort 18 , i.e. a pro¯table deviation exists in this case too. Hence no equilibrium with both levels of e®ort chosen exists either.
Step 4. Finally, we show that the result extends to the case in which trading of fractions is also allowed. This follows immediately from the observation that none of the pro¯table deviations we considered requires a minimum indivisible quantity to be purchased by agents. The pro¯tability of a contract depends in fact only on its rate¯d j;H =d j;L¯; the maximal amount of insurance o®ered, and the e®ort chosen by agents. And any consumption allocation strictly preferred to the original candidate allocation would still be preferred to a convex combination of the two.
As shown by Bisin and Guaitoli (1998) , an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries (possibly in mixed strategies, and for some selection of the equilibrium play of the agents) always exist; in particular, for all economies in ¡ \ ¡ 0 a pure strategy equilibrium with high e®ort and a nonzero level of trade exists (see also Hellwig (1983) ). The reader will realize that the arguments above imply that these strategic equilibria cannot converge, for the number of intermediaries I going to in¯nity, to degenerate equilibria with no trade, or to mixed equilibria with both e®ort levels chosen.
Conclusion
In a simple economy with moral hazard we have considered di®erent assumptions on the observability of agents' trades and examined, for each of them, whether the associated competitive equilibria can be obtained as the limit, as the number of intermediaries gets large, of the Nash equilibria of the economy where strate-gic¯nancial intermediaries compete by issuing contracts. While with symmetric information and with complete observability of trades convergence always holds, we have shown that the same is not true when the observability of agents' trades is more limited.
18 If (c H (a); c L (a)) = 2 A\B; agents strictly prefer to buy additional insurance, at a rate 1¡¼(b) ¼(b) : On the other hand, when (c H (a); c L (a)) 2 A \ B it is always possible, since w H ¡c H (a) c L (a)¡w L < 1¡¼(a) ¼(a) ; to move slightly upward and to the right in the region A \ B, and¯nd so an allocation strictly preferred to (c H (a); c L (a)). Figure 1 
